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Martha Nussbaum has built an approach to human development which looks not 
only at the evaluation of situations and actions, but contributes to description, under-
standing, and inspiration. The paper introduces this variety of purposes and a corre-
sponding range of appropriate methods.
1 Secondly, it characterizes the elements of 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, as part of an overall approach to ethics. It does this 
as a comparison with Sen’s capability approach, in terms of (a) general orientation, (b) 
intellectual style (including theory of personhood), (c) the components of their capabil-
ity approaches, (d) the roles undertaken by the approaches, and (e) the methods used 
(including the types of evidence, case material and presentation). Thirdly, it elucidates 
and assesses Nussbaum’s methods in detail, including her employment of imaginative 
literature and the use and analysis of emotions, and shows their importance for contrib-
uting in the broad and necessary range of roles which she has identified. 
                                                 
 
1 Revised version of a paper presented to the conference on Martha Nussbaum’ Capabilities Approach, 
held at St. Edmund’s College, Cambridge, England, 9-10 September 2002. CONTENTS 
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1  MULTIPLE TASKS AND MULTIPLE METHODS 
 
1.1  Requirements of a research and policy programme for human development 
A theory of human development needs to be more than only a theory in welfare 
economics or even ethics. Amartya Sen’s capability approach arose in response to the 
question of what is the appropriate space for evaluating people’s advantage and the dis-
tribution of advantages (‘equality of what?’). But a human development theory or ap-
proach has purposes additional to evaluation and requires additional types of informa-
tion. Sen has extended his capability approach considerably, notably in Development as 
Freedom, but it retains a welfare economics imprint. A human development theory 
should preferably be helpful––at least not misleading––in other roles too: including for 
understanding behaviour and explaining agency and satisfactions; for mobilization of 
attention, concern and commitment; and for guidance in the processes of formulating 
and making choices. Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach deals with these various 
vital purposes, not only the evaluation of advantages and their distribution. Her recent 
work strengthens her contributions in these areas, while retaining some problematic 
features. 
We can highlight a range of areas for constructive work on human development. 
Three are much discussed: what are the ethical values which should define and guide 
human development; what are causes and barriers for human development; and how 
can we operationalize a theoretical approach (a package of values, concepts and predic-
tive theories), in terms of measurement, institutions, instruments, procedures and policy 
priorities. 
As suggested in the table below, there are also three less discussed but major 
counterpart areas of work. Institutionalization, and thus operationalization, must cover 
not only the requirements of service delivery but further the requirements of establish-
ing and sustaining a programme of research and action, including by attracting and 
keeping the support of a body of researchers and potential users. Further, an ongoing 
research and policy programme of human development, and action on its findings, re-
quires a basis of widespread public commitment and concern. Lastly, without rich ob-
servation and evidence, each of the required commitment, concern, ethical theory and 
positive theory, are likely to be weak and insufficient. Nussbaum’s special quality is to 
give an overall vision of human development which attends to nearly all of these con-
nected areas. In the area of attracting and keeping the support of potential collaborators 
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and potential users, however, her rhetorical methods have had weaknesses as well as 
strengths. Here there is much to be learnt from Sen’s methods of research leadership. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Essential areas for work on human development 
MUCH DISCUSSED AREAS  VITAL SUPPLEMENTARY AREAS 





Rich observation & evidence 
Ethical Theory  Mobilization and sustaining of 







Stimulating and maintaining a 
research & policy programme 
•  Cooperative network of 
researchers and users, with 
resources and morale,sustained 
by: 
•  Judicious strategy and 
tactics 
 
The paper has the following main parts. This first part addresses the relationship 
between purposes and methods in ethics, a central theme in Nussbaum’s work. It dis-
tinguishes various foci or arenas in ethical and ethics-related discourse, and examines 
the possible corresponding methods. This sets the stage. 
The second part identifies and reviews major debates around Nussbaum’s capa-
bilities approach, and how the revised and deepened version published since 1998 re-
sponds to earlier comments. Nussbaum’s work in ethical theory, including her priority 
capabilities list, is presented as part of an overall approach to development ethics, in-
cluding ethics-related observation and practice. We will look at each of the six major 
areas highlighted in figure 1, not only at abstracted theoretical ethics. We make a de-
tailed comparison with Sen’s capability approach, and see its somewhat different pur-
poses and correspondingly different methods. 
The paper’s third part then looks directly at Nussbaum’s recommended meth-
ods: 
•  the engagement with a broad range of evidence, including personalized accounts; 
•  the use especially of imaginative and other idiographic literature, including in build-
ing concern and sympathy; 
•  the analysis and use of emotion, with special reference to compassion; and 
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•  a stated priority to ‘internal criticism’ (as part of rhetorical strategy and tactics), i.e. 
conversation with a cultural tradition by drawing on its own internal resources. 
We will consider these methods’ rationales, how far Nussbaum has respected the prin-
ciples, and how far she should open up to further types of evidence, collaboration, and 
interaction. 
 
1.2  Diverse stages in ethical/practical discourse require diverse methods 
The more types of purpose one has, the more types of evidence, conceptualiza-
tion and theorization one must use. Consider a series of stages or foci in practical eth-
ics: exposure to real cases; trying to grasp and interpret them using readily available 
‘everyday’ ideas; trying to build general concepts or theory, if and when felt necessary; 
returning to analyse real cases using such tools from theory; and making and acting on 
practical choices. More simply we may just refer to three stages: induction, theoriza-
tion, and decision-making/action. These different purposes and stages of thought are 
found to involve different styles of case-use and argumentation (Gasper 2000b). 
Induction involves reflecting on experiences of real people, preferably through 
striking, absorbing, accessible examples. Cases can sensitize people to situations, is-
sues, and ethical claims; build fellow-feeling; and convey notions about what is good. 
To do this they must be vivid, engrossing, and typically about real or plausible people. 
‘Constitutive narratives’ for example, says Benner, are stories which ‘exemplify posi-
tive notions about what is good’ (1991: 2), they convey core values within an area of 
practice and help to motivate and sustain its practitioners. 
The immediacy and force of the story, the real case, outdoes any general state-
ment. It contextualizes, adds personal flavour and credibility. Anecdotes too, not only 
thick rich narratives, may do part of this and with great economy. Suddenly, for exam-
ple, in the middle of a set of worthy but dry reports on field research on women-in-
development, the impersonal social science comes to life: 
[A comment from a female focus group on HIV/AIDS in Kabarole District, Western 
Uganda:] …Some men refuse to use condoms, especially those who are HIV positive. 
Some say “I can’t die alone.”’ [And from a male focus group:] ‘…She [wife] would refuse 
using a condom. She would send you away while you are still far…  She would say, “What 
about all the years we have spent together?’, or some will say, “For all the years we will 
stay together—how many sacks of condoms would we use? (Kabonesa 1998: 2). 
Direct reporting of speech brings an aliveness and poignancy that capture a reader. 
Brief anecdotes give no answers, at least no reliable ones, and are often used to dismiss 
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other groups. But they can instead establish a felt connection and open hearts and 
minds. The Voices of the Poor study (Narayan et al. 2000) lacks holistic narratives—
people’s comments have been processed and pigeonholed—but some of its quotations 
pierce like a knife. 
Theorizing, whether theory-building or the ‘modelling’ of a particular case, 
typically calls for more abstracted thought, with exclusions and simplifications to allow 
systematic analysis of or with the remaining factors. Often excluded will be details 
about people which could distract the analyser and distort her analysis. Sometimes the 
cases considered are wholly imaginary. A danger exists that theorizers will discuss only 
cases which fit well with their categories, and yet take their theories as confirmed. 
The cases which are looked at to support decision-making and action should 
again be typically real and often detailed, to convey the complexity of contexts and to 
show, in ‘learning narratives’ (Benner 1991), the skills needed to act on values. Such 
stories typically bring emotions which are remembered too, and which help in later re-
call and action. We change our moral views especially by experiences which strongly 
involve our emotions, says Nussbaum (e.g. 2001b: 133). Ideally such emotions and sto-
ries, sometimes of inspiring personal exemplars, help to build commitment as well as 
skills. 
The general principle that ethics and practical discourse include a variety of ac-
tivities, which have distinct purposes and different appropriate methods, informs Nuss-
baum’s work. This provides it with unusual richness and insight. Her capabilities ap-
proach thus involves much more than a list of specific priorities in or for human lives. 
In a preliminary description, one could say that it also involves: 
•  A wide but focussed vision, looking at the content and potentials in key aspects of 
people’s lives, all people’s lives. Nussbaum’s list of priority capabilities is a part of 
this. 
•  A way of looking, with openness and sympathy. 
•  Use of a wider range of evidence, including richer sources—fiction, poetry, auto-
biographies, and now also interviews and open-ended observation—than those used 
in economics and much other work on living standards.  
•  A deeper way of understanding: using rich pictures of mind, personhood, emotions 
and language; and a richer style of presentation, that seeks to explore the human 
content of that evidence, including its emotional content, to build concern both for 
persons and for particular aspects of life. 
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Should all this be included when we consider Nussbaum’s capabilities ap-
proach? Yes, for we are interested in what are the essential working parts of her ap-
proach to the ethics of human development, not in one part only. Furthermore we can 
see linkages within this set which suggest that it forms an interconnected package, not a 
priority capabilities list plus a bunch of quite separate features. While the others are not 
features that could only accompany a capabilities list, to specify and discuss her capa-
bilities approach without them is artificial and misleading. 
‘The capabilities approach’ is an imperfect title then for this overall perspective 
on human development. ‘Capability approach’ was a fair description of Sen’s proposal 
for welfare economics: to adopt an alternative primary space for the accounting of well-
being or advantage, an alternative to utility or real income. Sen has employed other ti-
tles when extending his work beyond welfare accounting: ‘development as freedom’ or 
UNDP’s ‘human development’. In her work Nussbaum has used the label ‘Aristotelian 
social democracy’ in the past, but outgrew that. ‘Cosmopolitan humanism’ might fit 
now, with perhaps ‘the capabilities approach’ as a secondary label to indicate the dis-
aggregated perspective on people’s lives and the respect for their freedoms. Or one 
might focus on what the approach approaches, and speak of Nussbaum’s approach to 
the ethics of human development. Here however, just as Alkire (2002) uses the label 
‘capability approach’ to refer to Sen’s entire system, I will usually refer to Nussbaum’s 
overall approach as her ‘capabilities approach’. 
Nussbaum’s approach attends to issues not covered in Sen’s, though his in turn 
contains purposes and aspects, such as measurement, not covered in hers. Sen has a 
stronger planning orientation or relevance; Nussbaum has a stronger orientation to de-
vising basic constitutional principles, as seen in WHD, and also to citizen education, as 
seen in her books Poetic Justice and Cultivating Humanity. This paper too is written 
from the perspective of an educator, and thus one who seeks long-run influence, more 
than with the shorter-term focus of a government or NGO planner. 
 
 
2 MAPPING  NUSSBAUM'S  CAPABILITIES APPROACH 
 
2.1  The evolution of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach since the early 1990s 
The WIDER research programme led by Sen and Nussbaum in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s led to two noteworthy volumes, The Quality of Life and Women, Cul-
  5 
ture and Development. These consolidated and extended ideas on what we should mean 
by improvement in the life of a person or group, and on how far answers to such ques-
tions are culturally relative. Nussbaum and Sen have espoused somewhat different posi-
tions. Some people find attractions in Nussbaum’s neo-Aristotelian capabilities ethic, 
compared to Sen’s thinner, more Kantian approach. It gives a rich picture of what is a 
full human life; talks in terms of real people, real life, not remote abstractions; and may 
thus be able to reach wider or different ranges of people than economists and analytic 
philosophers (Gasper 1997: 299). At the same time, even amongst those who felt such 
strengths or potentials, Nussbaum’s work from that period (notably Nussbaum 1988, 
1992, 1993, 1995a, 1995b) raised considerable misgivings: ‘…a “top-table”, still too 
disciplinary, and emphatically Aristotelian style might bring not just substantive intel-
lectual shortcomings, but antagonize others and thus short-circuit the debate it sought to 
advance’ (Gasper 1997: 300). 
Nussbaum’s subsequent work, most fully seen in Women and Human Develop-
ment (WHD), has taken up the challenges voiced by many commentators. WHD gives a 
deeper, more measured, integrated and practical statement than in the earlier papers, 
which she rightly declares now to be superseded (e.g. 2000b: 103). Some major new 
areas of exposure and thought are apparent: an increasing absorption in the hard practi-
cal reasoning of law, especially since her move from a department of classics partly to a 
law school; her adoption of a Rawlsian political liberalism which provides space for 
various comprehensive ethics rather than tries to enforce any one; and perhaps most 
important, research visits to India, including intense field tours in 1997 and 1998 and 
considerable associated study. 
Nussbaum now effectively incorporates insights from communitarianism, while 
avoiding relativism; and demonstrates in more detail, in theory and by cases, how there 
is scope for cultural variation in operationalizing stipulated central capabilities and in 
life beyond them. She notes a series of channels for this (2000b: 132): (i) the stipulation 
is of only a limited core set of priority capabilities, beyond which there can be variety; 
(ii) the core set includes liberties and choice; (iii) these priorities are stated only in gen-
eral terms, and are (iv) to be then operationalized by local democratic processes; and 
(v) they are stated in terms of ensuring capabilities (as opportunities), rather than insist-
ing on the corresponding functionings. Feature (i) marks the move away from her ear-
lier advocacy for public policy of a more extensive and, in particular, more individual-
istic ethic. 
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She thus makes clear her support for a ‘political’ rather than ‘comprehensive’ 
liberalism; and for an ‘overlapping consensus’ model (as argued by many basic needs 
theorists; Braybrooke 1987, Gasper 1996). She now focuses on specifying criteria of ‘a 
decent social minimum’ (2000a: 75), rather than a comprehensive list of proposed re-
quirements for human flourishing; and on a limited set of more basic capabilities, in 
contrast to a longer list of required functionings. Her early 1990s version had instead 
propounded criteria for, first, a life deemed ‘human’, and second, a life deemed a good 
human life. The newer version has a more useful intermediate focus, as advised by 
various commentators. 
The ‘top table’, Aristotelian, combative, Northern feel has considerably de-
clined. Aristotle remains a major influence but no longer dominant. The self-
designation as Aristotelian has gone, reflecting awareness of the dangers and of her 
other affiliations, new and old, including to the Enlightenment and its aims of liberty 
and ‘a life enlightened by the critical use of reason’ (1999b: 2; see also 2000b: 103). 
 
2.2  General orientation and the elements of their capability approaches 
To understand Nussbaum’s capabilities approach let us compare it with Sen’s 
work, with special reference to the mature versions in WHD and Sen’s recent synthetic 
statement, Development as Freedom. Nussbaum herself offers a comparison (WHD, pp. 
11-15), but this was written prior to the appearance of Development as Freedom and 
draws excessive contrasts. 
I suggest a multi-part comparison, in figures 2 and 4 below. In brief, it covers 
these aspects: 
A.  General orientation: Sen and Nussbaum have substantially different audiences and 
so engage in different conversations. 
B.  In terms of the intellectual tools they bring, Nussbaum employs a much more elabo-
rate theory of personhood. 
C.  This difference is reflected in some of the elements of their capability approaches 
(CAs) proper, including their concepts of capability, as we will see shortly. (The ta-
ble’s comparison here uses the set of elements which I have used to characterize 
Sen’s approach in Gasper 2002.) They differ too on the need for a list of priority 
capabilities. We will see that this relates to different sets of roles identified and 
adopted for their approaches. 
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D.  Concerning roles, both Nussbaum and Sen impressively span from review of ex-
perience, through building theoretical frameworks, to forging proposals for action. 
Nussbaum seems more conscious of the additional roles of building engagement, 
concern and motivation. For questioning consumerism in rich countries, Nuss-
baum’s approach offers more too. 
E.  Nussbaum uses a different, on the whole wider and richer, methodological ‘palette’, 
corresponding to her different conceptions of audience, personhood and roles. 
Many elements in the comparison will be familiar to readers of Sen, Nussbaum and 
their major commentators (e.g. Crocker 1995, Alkire 2002; see also Gasper 1997, 
2000a, 2002), especially within the first three aspects. There is no space to discuss all 
the elements again in detail here. The main purpose of the tables is instead to organize 
the comparison and to bring out some less familiar elements. Several of these concern 
roles and method, and will be presented in figure 4 and the next subsection. This sub-
section takes the more familiar focus of Nussbaum’s list of priority capabilities, after 
first clarifying the concept of capability; and shows how the list too should be under-
stood in terms of its underlying roles. 
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FIGURE 2 
First three parts of a comparison of the capability(capabilities) ethics of Sen and Nussbaum 
A. ORIENTATION  SEN NUSSBAUM 
Main audience  Economists, analytical philosophers, 
UNDP, World Bank &c. 
Literary philosophers, humanists, 
feminists, lawyers, civil society 
Style  Politically safe: ‘cautious boldness, 
seeking a wide, mainstream audience 
with terms, tones and topics that will 
appeal and engage them.’ (Gasper 
2000a) 
Bold  
(but cautious now on issues in India 
– e.g. Shah Bano case)  
Attention to culture  Limited Extensive 
Multi-cultural  Yes  Has become more multi-cultural (for 
contemporary world; was already so 
for literary and past worlds) 
Universalist / relativist  Universalist, with much space for 
variation.  
No ‘explicit arguments against 
relativism’ (WHD, p. 12) - ? 
Universalist, with much space for 
variation. 









Yes  Yes, ‘Principle of each person’s ca-
pability’: no one is expendable 
(WHD, p. 12), each should be 
treated as an end 
Theory of the person  Limited content: includes reason and 
desires (plus ‘sympathy’ and ‘com-
mitment’); little on meanings, or on 
skills of reasoning, valuing, operating 
and co-operating. People as choosers 
rather than actors (+) 
Rich picture of thought, including 
emotions, and the influences on 
them. Stronger than Sen on mean-
ings and action, including on using 
emotions.  
Emphasis on freedom  Very high.  
Including increased stress on the 
instrumental value of freedom, in 
addition to its independent value and 
constructive value (role in building 
validated moral conclusions). 
Emphasis on freedom as choice.  
‘Development as Freedom’. 
Strong focus also on justice. 
Relatively little on care. 
High.
2  
Less market focus; more stress than 
Sen on law, emotional development, 
etc. 
Emphasis on freedom as self-
mastery? 
‘Development as Human Decency / 
Flourishing’. 
Strong focus also on justice. 
Substantial attention also to care. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Nussbaum is sometimes as strong as Sen in the degree of normative priority she declares for capabili-
ties (WHD, p.63, calls capabilities ‘the’, not ‘a’ relevant space for comparisons of quality of life. Priority 
to capabilities is more plausible for prescriptive purposes, and less for evaluative purposes, where the 
case for attention to functionings is high (e.g. p. 87). She exaggerates the case against requiring certain 
functionings (which is widespread, e.g. in road use; p. 88). But elsewhere she notes cases where manda-
tory functioning is justified (often for children, health, safety, and various duties; (2000b: 130-1). Her 
principle of equal capability applies only up to the level of the decent minimum. Like Sen she grants 
weight to other distributive principles too, as illustrated in her treatment of cases. 






1. Broad informational 
base 
Yes. A wide range of vision, looking at 
the contents of people’s lives, all 
people’s lives 
Yes, even wider 
2. A language (family 
of terms) 
Its main creator  Partly shares this language, but less 
wedded to it; partly modifies it 
2a. Notion of 
functioning 
Highly generalized and abstract  More concrete, with attention to 
experiential content of some central 
functionings 




influenced, theory-derived conception 
of ‘capability’: as opportunities only 
Experience-derived, plural, 
phenomenological notions of 
‘capabilities’: as potentials, as skills, 
as opportunities  
2c. Well-being / 
agency 
Extensive use of this distinction, since 
centrally argues with and against 
utilitarians 
Prefers categories less based on 
arguing with utilitarians (and which 
thus can half adopt their biases; 
WHD, p. 14) 
2d. ‘Sympathy’ / 
‘commitment’ 
These distinctions exemplify the well-
being /agency distinction, but Sen 
does not do much with them 
A major focus. Goes far deeper than 
Sen, with more and other terms 
3a. Moral priority to 
capabilities, in 
evaluation 
Yes (the key ‘space’ for evaluation).  
Choice presumed not to become 
oppressive. 
Yes. The preoccupation with 
capability rather than functioning 
may be less though than in Sen 
3b. Moral priority to 
liberty 
Yes  Yes, in that liberty is not to be traded 
away for more of other goods (WHD, 
p. 12) 
4. Priority to capability 
as a policy rule 
Yes 
[One can accept 4 without accepting 
3, but not vice versa] 
Yes. This is consistent with 
Nussbaum’s focus on legal 
constitutions 
5 & 6: how to 
prioritize, including 
amongst capabilities   
5: by having ‘reason to value’ 
6: Sen points to public processes, 
calls for participation 
5: Yes 
6: Nussbaum focuses on processes 




No explicit list. No clear ‘Marxian/ 
Aristotelian idea of truly human 
functioning’ (WHD, p. 13). Sen is 
ambiguous here 
Yes 
7b. Link to human 
rights framework 
Now quite strongly linked (HDR 2000); 
but with doubts about rights seen as 
hard side-constraints (WHD, p. 14) 
Basic rights to threshold levels for 
priority capabilities. Capability 
approach as ‘a basis for central 





‘Sen nowhere uses the idea of a 
threshold’ (WHD, p. 12) - ? 
Rather, he sometimes uses it, but 
does not specify thresholds 
unilaterally 
Emphasis on achieving basic 
threshold levels, above expanding 
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2.2.1  Concepts of capability 
A merit of Nussbaum’s version compared to Sen’s has been the distinctions she 
makes between types of capability, although her labels can be questioned (Crocker 
1995, Gasper 1997 and 2002). She uses ‘basic capability’ for undeveloped potentials; 
the label ‘basic’ is, however, ambiguous and is often used by others normatively rather 
than, as here, positively. She uses ‘internal capability’ for developed potential skills; 
but ‘basic’ capabilities are also internal to people. She has replaced her earlier label of 
‘external capability’ for the attainable options which people have (plain ‘capabilities’ in 
Sen’s usage) given their ‘internal capabilities’ and the relevant external conditions. Her 
new label, ‘combined capability’, captures the relevance of both sets of factors but 
could bring misleading connotations too. And she uses ‘central capability’ for a prior-
ity-status attainable option, though again ‘central’ is an ambiguous term. The adjective 
‘priority’ might be more transparent; however Nussbaum does indeed make a claim for 
the instrumental and normative centrality of her listed key capabilities. They are held to 
be valued in themselves, necessary features of being fully human, and instrumentally 
central for any life (2000a: 74). Figure 3 sums up this set of terms, in comparison with 
Sen’s terms, everyday language, and a possible alternative set of labels. Whatever the 




Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability concepts and labels 
CONCEPT  An undeveloped 
human potential, 
skill, capacity 
A developed human 
potential, skill, 
capacity 
The attainable (set 
of) functioning(s), 
given a person’s 
skills and external 
conditions 




SEN’S LABEL    Capability 
(this is also a periodic 
usage in the HDRs) 






















(P for potential) 
S-capability 
(S for skill) 
O-capability, or 
option 
(O for option) 
Priority capability 
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2.2.2  The proposed list of priority capabilities 
Nussbaum’s exercise in theory building aims to identify a largely consensual or 
persuasive list of universal priority (opportunity-) capabilities. Why? She notes that the 
list is permanently open to debate and re-making, and to local interpretation and thresh-
old-setting (e.g. thresholds are ‘set by internal political processes in each nation, often 
with the contribution of a process of judicial review’, 2001a: 418). So why try to per-
sonally specify such a list? The answer may be that without a set of core entrenched 
priorities we leave too much open to interpretation by the powerful; and that Nussbaum 
seeks to convey a method of thinking, with principles of procedure and selection, for 
developing such a priority set. Rather than being an exercise in monological elite rule, 
such a list would provide a starting point and ground for a bill of rights, part of a legal 
constitution. ‘Human rights are, in effect, justified claims to such basic capabilities or 
opportunities’ (1999a: 87). Nussbaum’s greater emphasis previously on Aristotelianism 
than on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, plus other aspects of her earlier style, 
have contributed to the still recurrent charges of elitism. 
Her list highlights capacities and opportunities to choose. Some critics propose 
that it is illiberal to insist that people must have choice and the capacities for choice. 
But choice includes the option to choose a way of life which is without choice (in a re-
ligious order, for example). She provides examples of well-educated women who 
choose to wear a burka although not obliged to, and of some who make that choice af-
ter a period living without the burka; but they do not insist that others should be de-
prived of the choice and obliged to wear the burka (e.g. 2000a: 153). Similarly she 
gives striking examples of people celebrating their increased field of choice, such as 
thanks to literacy. 
Are such views and Nussbaum’s proposed priorities really a wide consensus? 
While Gayatri Spivak (1999) for one suggests not, the priorities seem compatible with 
the huge Voices of the Poor study. Nussbaum sometimes evinces optimism about con-
vergence on a consensus core set of capabilities, and is surprisingly optimistic about the 
impacts of oppression on preferences and acceptance (e.g. ‘regimes that fail to deliver 
health, or basic security, or liberty are unstable’––2000a: 155). But her list in any case 
rests not on current opinion polls, but on a proposed criterion of prioritization and on 
the expectation which we saw that its results will converge with those of a criterion of 
informed desire. 
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While Nussbaum does carefully apply a criterion––what constitutes a decent 
human life?––it remains somewhat vague and its application intuitive. Her preference 
for the Mosaic length of ten makes the resulting list appear a little contrived. In con-
trast, Doyal & Gough’s A Theory of Need (1991) uses sharper criteria––first, what are 
the requirements for physical and mental health and of autonomy of agency? and sec-
ond, what are those for higher levels of flourishing, including critical autonomy?––and 
a more explicit and structured method of application, which proceeds back down a 
chain of causation from desirable functionings to required capabilities to commodity 
characteristics to specific satisfiers to implied societal preconditions (see also Gough 
2000, 2002; Gasper 1996). Nussbaum lacks this structure and thus her list becomes a 
more personal selection of priorities from across several of these levels. 
So, Nussbaum’s work could be seen as justifying a bill of rights; but is less rig-
orous and elaborated than Doyal and Gough’s parallel work, which corroborates but 
upgrades the approach behind her list. Why then has Nussbaum’s work had more atten-
tion and impact? Part of the reason is that Nussbaum more strongly embeds her means 
of prioritization into a larger humanistic project. While her prioritization methods may 
be unrefined, she has elaborated additional methods which address much else of what 
we require in human development ethics. 
The theory needs refinement in a number of other areas. Any theory faces diffi-
cult boundary cases. Nussbaum’s requires qualification for cases beyond its core focus 
of the adult householder citizen, such as the seriously disabled or ‘differently abled’ for 
whom some capabilities are out of reach (see Nussbaum 2002); and, as Waerness 
stresses, for the half of humankind who are children or infirm. Nussbaum already does 
some of this qualification, in a practical style enriched by her legal studies. She consid-
ers the case of religious celibates, who seem to reject that ‘it is always rational to want 
[all the specified core human capabilities] whatever else one wants’; and argues that 
they rationally want the sexual and other opportunities whose use they reject, for only 
thus does their sexual and other abstinence acquire meaning (WHD, p. 88). Many her-
mits may disagree. She argues that hermits in fact seek affiliation to others (p. 92), by 
praying for others or indirectly promoting universal spiritual upliftment. In fact some 
hermits seek no societal affiliation, no human betterment, only an affiliation to some 
notion of the divine. 
Nussbaum has here two ways forward, not mutually exclusive. She could take 
the main path followed by Doyal & Gough: establishing and promoting the needs im-
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plied by a more restricted, sharper normative criterion. She can then avoid insisting that 
hermits want sexual opportunities. Secondly, if she wishes to instead or also work with 
the more extensive and vaguer criterion of human decency—less extensive and vague 
than the ‘good life’ criterion expounded in her early 1990s work but still not likely to 
give a tidy list of ten – then the theory requires fuzzier specification. She already identi-
fies two of the central capabilities––affiliation and practical reason––as more central 
than others; so comparably there can be some marginal cases and the list will have no 
sharp end point. Some of the proposed capabilities may be better seen as important de-
siderata than as absolute requirements (Crocker 1995; Gasper 1997). In this second op-
tion the list could be presented as an illustration of a methodology which offers a 
framework for dialogical investigation and practical specification (cf. Alkire & Black 
1997; Alkire 2002). Otherwise it arouses fears in some people of a preemptive bid to 
capture the ear of metropolitan power-holders. The international human rights tradition 
and the global ethics movement of Hans Küng and others can help to convey how a 
fuzzy theory can still guide choices, structure ongoing areas of debate, and respect and 
face differences. 
A list should be theorized and relativized by identifying and highlighting the 
roles it is meant to serve. If we see the list as a method, or part of a method or family of 
methods within an approach, then we can think more effectively about its functions and 
then about how to construct and use it. The list is a means not an end; if we focus on 
the ends we can sometimes find suitable alternative, or supplementary, or modified 
means. The valuable elements in the overall capabilities approach should not be endan-




2.3  Roles and methods 
2.3.1 Roles 
A conscious role of Sen’s capability approach is (1) to increase the range of 
types of information which we use, in order to provide a more adequate evaluative ac-
counting. He has lately highlighted a second role: (2) to provide underpinnings for con-
ceptions of human rights. Nussbaum shares these aims. She highlights too a democratic 
sister to the role of mobilizing more relevant information: (3) to provide a relevant lan-
guage to express people’s own multi-faceted concerns better than measures of income 
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and utility do (2000b: 138-9). Next, the evaluative accounter, not merely his present 
accounting, can be affected by the choice of language. Two more roles of Nussbaum’s 
approach are thus: (4) to make observers more open and enrich their perception of the 
content of lives; and, as a result it is hoped, (5) to build sympathy and commitment. 
Imaginatively ‘standing in other people’s shoes’ can change you, not only your infor-
mation set. 
Nussbaum––who was an actress in an early stage of her career––is more con-
scious or explicit about these later roles. While Sen rightly points out that goodwill ex-
ists, contrary to the assumptions and influence of much economics, he doesn't examine 
methods by which it might be fostered and defended. Yet it often exists only as a thing 
of rags and tatters. He has argued that public information in a democracy prevents fam-
ines, but this presumes that the informed majority cares about a threatened minority. It 
therefore fails in some cases intra-nationally, as well as of course inter-nationally.  
Figure 4 extends our comparison of Sen and Nussbaum into these areas of roles 
and methods. It uses criteria which have been mentioned earlier, especially in our pre-
liminary description of Nussbaum’s approach. 
FIGURE 4 
Final two parts of a comparison of the capability(ies) ethics of Sen and Nussbaum 
D. ROLES  SEN NUSSBAUM 
Multi-mode (witness, 
theory, policy) 
Yes. A source of his effectiveness  Yes; her detailed policy orientation 
has grown 
To direct attention to a 
wide range of 
information  and make 
observers more open 
Yes  Yes; even more so 
To provide a language 
to express people’s 
concerns 
Less so  Much more so 




Yes, though receives less emphasis 
than the knowledge roles of a wider 
range of information 
Yes, much more than in Sen. To 
build sensitivity both for persons and 
for particular aspects of life. Explicitly 
cosmopolitan, universal 
Basis for action?  Good with those who are already 
committed. Limited with others? 
Greater potential to understand the 
requirements of action and to 
motivate it 
Action on what? 
Consumerism? 
Undiscussed? (‘he sidelines how the 
acquisition of commodities can 
sometimes be at the cost of much 
human freedom’, Gasper 2000a) 
Attention to this is compatible with 
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E. ON METHOD  SEN NUSSBAUM 
Way of looking  Broad informational base, plus vivid 
illustrations 
A way of looking with openness and 
concern 
Range of types of evi-
dence 
Mostly official statistics and histori-
ography. 
Some use of testimony and personal 
witness 
A wide range of evidence, including 
richer sources – fiction, poetry, auto-
biography, now sometimes also in-
terviews, direct observation 
Way of understanding  Humane social scientist  A deeper way of understanding, us-
ing richer pictures of self, mind, emo-
tions and language 
Style of presentation  Humane committed social scientist  A richer style of presentation, that 
explores the human content of evi-
dence, including its emotional con-
tent, to build concern and commit-
ment 
Type of cases  Often uses artificial cases, simplified 
‘situations’ 
Rich cases, sometimes real cases 
Rhetorical repertoire 
(logos, pathos, ethos) 
Attends to and is effective in all 
three of these rhetorical dimensions; 
including by adapting his style for 
different audiences. It is another 
source of his influence, though that 
is less outside analytic philosophy 
and economics 
Attends forcefully to each aspect, but 
sometimes lapses in ethos.  
Has great power for some audi-
ences, but lesser access, credibility 




2.3.2 Rhetorical  style 
The terms used in figure 4 to describe rhetorical repertoire are those for the as-
pects of persuasion recognized by Greek rhetoric: logos (reasoning), pathos (the felt 
experience which a discourse draws on and the feelings it evokes), and ethos (including 
the mood of confidence which the author establishes with the audience). 
In terms of reasoning, WHD explicitly does not represent Nussbaum’s full phi-
losophical defence of her approach. A fuller statement is indeed required, to synthesize 
ideas scattered across her work and to address major objections in a sufficiently sus-
tained way. However, WHD buttresses the approach in several ways. One is by com-
parison with alternatives, which strengthens audience confidence. For example she 
gives an impressive refutation of pure proceduralism, the idea that principles of justice 
can be established without any substantive ideas about the nature of the agents whom 
these principles are meant to concern (e.g. p. 139). Conclusions could only be drawn 
from Rawls’s Original Position thought experiment by including ideas, open or tacit, 
about the basic purposes or interests of the parties. WHD clarifies the relationship to 
other theories. Thus it gives informed desire theory a subsidiary normative role, and 
shows at length how closely it and her approach can converge on implications. 
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Another deepening of the approach, at least to some eyes, in terms of both ar-
gument and tone, is Nussbaum’s lengthy and sympathetic response to the criticism that 
spiritual and religious aspirations were slighted in her previous accounts of central ca-
pabilities (see e.g. Alkire & Black 1997). Religion is highlighted as a legitimate re-
sponse to needs for expression, association, and affiliation (2001a: 419). She maintains 
principled limits to the ‘free’ exercise of religion; it is not to be free of reason, consis-
tency, and humanity. Some other aspects of Nussbaum’s presentation might still harm 
the ethos she creates. We will return to this later. 
 
2.3.3 Methods 
While Nussbaum’s recent work clarifies her approach’s objectives, and its fore-
ground components and their justification, her special strengths in methodological rich-
ness and in the conception of personhood are longstanding. They have changed less 
since the mid 1990s, yet deserve equal or greater attention now in discussing her ap-
proach to human development. 
The method components overlap and mutually reinforce each other, but each 
deserves separate specification as in figure 4. A broad informational base and a rich 
manner of presentation can contribute to empathy, being able to understand others’ 
feelings; and to sympathy, seeing with concern, caring. However: ‘Whether such empa-
thy will promote compassion on the part of insiders or outsiders…will depend on our 
judgements of seriousness, responsibility, and appropriate concern’ (2001a: 440). 
Whether compassion leads to caring action depends also on will, and on views about 
transjurisdictional duties and the respective roles of different bodies. 
Nussbaum’s universalistic language focuses on what we share as human beings: 
it aims to give respect to what deserves respect, not to morally irrelevant features like 
race, gender and arguably nationality. Her modulated but outspoken cosmopolitanism 
(see e.g. Nussbaum 1994), in which she advocates concentric circles of decreasingly 
intense affiliation, is linked to her method. To look at the detailed contents of people’s 
lives is considered a way of strengthening not just recognition of what we share behind 
the circumstantial details but also the emotional acceptance of this shared humanity. 
What is the relationship between stages, purposes and methods in Sen and 
Nussbaum’s work? Figure 5 elaborates upon the picture of purposes in figure 4’s 
‘multi-mode’ row (witness, theory, policy), but uses the abbreviated classification of 
stages: exposure and induction; theorization; and prescribing for action. It then indi-
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cates how even upon the same stage the two approaches differ, reflecting their creators’ 
different disciplines and background perspectives. Sen’s central focus is as a theorist, 
whose work is enriched by and enriches empirical observation and policy analysis. 
Nussbaum’s methodology centres on detailed reflection on ‘life-size’ cases which in-
volve recognizably real people, whether truly real or literary creations. In the Aristote-
lian tradition such extended treatment of cases is considered to foster ethical discern-
ment (1999b: 8). Her work across the three stages is less tri-partite: the case reflection 
often spans all three. And her methods include close textual analysis––usually but not 




Comparison of Sen and Nussbaum’s attention to stages and cases 
 
 SEN  NUSSBAUM 
FIRST STAGE    
Exposure to 
experience  
Some attention (high by economics 
standards; low for humanities). 
Compared to previous welfare 
economics, his CA leads one to 
consider substantive contents of lives 
Anecdotes and situations 
Much more attention than in Sen, 
including to thoughts, intentions, 
feelings, life-histories, and thus to 
particularized individuals as well 
as selected functionings 
Histories and rich fiction 
SECOND STAGE     
Theorization Intensive  formal analysis of simplified, 
abstracted situations, often imagined 
ones 
Theorizing here is much less 
separated from the study of 
cases Substantial but less 
detailed attention than Sen; less 
apparatus 
THIRD STAGE     
Prescribing for 
action 
Substantial attention, especially jointly 
with Jean Dreze 
As intensive as Sen, but with a 
different focus: on individual legal 





The stylized comparison above of Sen and Nussbaum has brought out in particular that 
Nussbaum’s approach contains not only arguments against relativism and for a univer-
sal priorities list, but has a range of purposes and corresponding methods which de-
mand examination as central to her project. The next part of the paper proceeds with 
this agenda, and with how Nussbaum in practice uses her proclaimed methods. 
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3  NUSSBAUM AND ETHICS METHODOLOGY: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 
Nussbaum advocates a way of looking with openness and concern, a wide but 
focussed vision which covers key aspects of people’s lives, and a richer way of under-
standing and style of presentation, to explore the human content of evidence, including 
its emotional content. She proposes empathy and stresses how it links to compassion. In 
all these respects she in large part does what she advocates. But one also encounters 
repeatedly expressed dissatisfactions with her range of evidence, range of interlocutors, 
and style of debate. 
A full discussion would assess each of Nussbaum’s proposals on method, in-
cluding in relation to her purposes, and assess her practice against her theories. Here we 
must be selective. We will consider: the extent of her intellectual sources, her limited 
field exposure and collaborations; her use of rich human narratives; her examination of 
the key emotion of compassion; and her sometimes still perhaps over-confrontational 
or, surprisingly, occasionally over-accomodating argumentative style. 
 
3.1  Range of sources 
Sen, Nussbaum and the UN Human Development Reports conclude that not all 
things of major importance are commensurable, neither when we think of life as a 
whole nor even when we discuss public policy. Neither should we ignore some of them 
during one era of history by pretending that fair is foul and foul is fair (Keynes’s de-
scription of the strategy of centering policy on economic growth). We therefore need to 
evaluate by using diverse sets of information. Nussbaum goes further, since to evalua-
tion she adds purposes of explanation and persuasion. She mobilizes a range of types of 
material in addition to those conventional in philosophy and economics: fiction, poetry, 
autobiographies and now sometimes also interviews and direct observation. Her long-
standing and enlightening examination of imaginative literature—classical Greek, Hel-
lenistic, Roman and modern European—now extends to cover less exclusively North-
ern, bourgeois or fictional sources. She draws also from law and psychology, and 
thoughtfully treats the practical choices faced by judges and (other) policy-makers, in-
cluding issues of balancing, feasibility and timing. Her post-1994 work thus engages 
much more with varied modern realities of livelihood and politics. Her limited but in-
tense research trips to India in March 1997 and December 1998 influence WHD 
strongly and are part of a more extensive engagement. 
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Both field visits to India were a matter of a few weeks: active, tightly pro-
grammed, but still a matter of weeks; the second occurred shortly before finalization of 
WHD’s Preface. ‘What was Kant’s or Rawls’s field exposure?’, and ‘Literature is the 
perfect substitute’, some might say in defence. Philosophers must primarily base them-
selves on the field studies done by others. But credibility and image problems arise for 
social philosophers of global human development if they work in isolation and without 
varied experience of the globe. How reliably can they interpret what they read? Credit 
goes to Nussbaum for exposing herself more directly. At the age of fifty she experi-
enced ‘days that were different from any days I had ever spent’ (WHD, p. ix); but she 
does not pause to reflect on the possible impact of months, or years, of exposure. 
The extent and quality of one’s range of interlocutors is a vital potential com-
pensation for the inevitable limits of one’s own experience. Nussbaum disciplines her 
ideas by contemporary cases and the situations of ordinary people, not only by Proust, 
the Greek tragedies, and Henry James. But the balance remains still heavily towards the 
‘Northern highbrow’ mix. While Nussbaum has added some substantial, modern, non-
European cases and coverage, in WHD those cases remain relatively few and in the 
style of literary cameos, indeed sometimes taken from literature (notably a story by 
Rabindranath Tagore). She makes intensive and good use of the cases of two modern 
Indian women - Vasanti in Ahmedabad, and Jayamma in Trivandrum. These cases open 
the book and are regularly referred to in its later stages. Yet they seem rather thin in 
number (two) and depth (perhaps from single meetings, reliant on interpreters?) for 
Nussbaum’s ambitious purposes. Nussbaum has promised a later fuller book, but ap-
pears to have fuller philosophical coverage in mind, not a fuller experiential base or 
collaboration with a Southern author or authors. We can take this gap as space for fur-
ther work by others, including both social scientists and philosophers, especially 
through cross-disciplinary and multi-national collaborations. 
 
3.2  Ethical insights from thick-textured humanist narratives 
In Poetic Justice Nussbaum argues that: 
a novel such as [Dickens’s] Hard Times is a paradigm of such [needs/capabilities based] 
assessment [of people’s quality of life]. Presenting the life of a population with a rich vari-
ety of qualitative distinctions, and complex individual descriptions of functioning and im-
pediments to functioning, using a general notion of human need and human functioning in a 
highly concrete context, it provides the sort of information such an assessment requires, and 
it involves the reader in the task of making the assessment (Nussbaum 1998: 245). 
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Hard Times is held to have both a critical and a constructive role. It brings to life, in the 
person of Gradgrind, the narrow perspective of routine economic thought. This insists 
that everything important can be measured, compared and hence aggregated in a single 
calculation which allows a tidy correct solution; and further that people’s motives are 
simple too, solely self-interest. The novel refutes the perspective, through Gradgrind’s 
story and that of his family. Thus what is called ‘sophisticated economics is a bad 
novel’ (1998: 233), it tells poor stories and is acceptable only when it makes clear that 
it is a reductionist, as-if, exercise. 
Constructively, good novels like Hard Times can and do the following, Nuss-
baum argues: 
•  Show ‘a style of human relating in which…moral attitudes are made more generous 
by the play of the imagination’ (1998: 234), thus contributing to a habit of consider-
ing that the other ‘has a complex inner life, in some ways mysterious, in some ways 
analogous to [one’s] own’ (1998: 236). This reaching behind surfaces contributes to 
more adequate explanations of life and to better societies. Lack of such imaginative 
entry to others’ minds brings ‘psychological narcissism, of citizens who have diffi-
culty connecting to other human beings with a sense of the human significance of 
the issues at stake’ (2001a: 426). 
•  Show the joy and value of some things––including play and fun––in themselves, 
not merely as items for use. 
•  Cross the boundaries between cultures: ‘works of imaginative literature are fre-
quently far more supple and versatile [tools] across cultural boundaries than are phi-
losophical treatises with their time-bound and culture-bound terms of art, their fre-
quent lack of engagement with common hopes and fears’ (1998: 242). 
•  Promote a shareable perspective on ‘the human being’ (p. 241): a recognition of 
‘human needs that transcend boundaries of time, place, class, religion and ethnicity, 
and [make] the focus of [our] moral deliberation the question of their adequate ful-
filment’ (p. 242); and thereby embody ‘enlightenment ideals of the equality and 
dignity of all human life, not of traditionalism or parochialism’ (p. 243). 
Some literary theorists suggest that imaginative literature is uniquely good in 
this. They see ‘literature as a distinctive mode of thought about being human’ (Haines 
1998: 21). Whether ‘literature’ for them extends beyond novels, poems, and plays, to 
essays, biography and travelogues, is not clear or agreed. Adamson might restrict as 
well as extend: for her ‘literature’ is ‘literary art of some depth’ (1998: 85). Literary 
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critics are likely to include their own work here, sometimes legitimately; but thickness 
of texture alone does not bring literary depth. For development ethics, real narratives 
are vitally important, more so I think than fiction; consider for example the impact of 
recent works of biography and autobiography from China, such as Wild Swans (Chang 
1991) and Son of the Revolution (Heng & Shapiro 1983). However Nussbaum’s main 
focus and that of much of the related discussion is on imaginative writing, with the 
claim that this has special features. It takes us into a variety of other minds, in ways that 
other modes hardly can. 
The thick language of literature ‘expresses our moral intuitions in a way that the 
“thin” language [of much philosophy] does not’, argues Parker (p. 10), drawing on 
Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self. Restriction to the thin languages of philosophy 
leads us to talk in fact about something else than our moral thoughts. In reaction to the 
Wars of Religion, Enlightenment ethics chose to proceed with a conception of persons 
as individual reasoners only, neglecting their other features and capacities, even their 
processes of maturation as persons. ‘The abstract moral deliberator has no capacities 
that can be shown only through their development’, unlike in the richer moral psychol-
ogy seen in the Bildungsroman (Diamond 1998: 52). Various philosophers now make 
such points at a general level. Nussbaum is ‘a distinguished exception’ in providing 
also in-depth readings of literature, remarks Haines (1998: 30). This adds weight to her 
view on whether literature can be a substitute for philosophical ethics. She concludes 
rather that poetry and philosophy have complementary ways of thinking ethically and 
that a role of literary criticism is to mediate between the two (Haines, 32). 
Amongst the other routes by which sympathy is aroused (or withheld) are pic-
tures. From the images of September 11 in New York, compare two sets and how they 
can be read. First, the cathartic impact of the airliners tearing into the twin towers, the 
sleek closed impersonal faces of global economic power: a knocking over of the arro-
gant skittles of Gomorrah, David felling Goliath. Impersonality and complacency apply 
as much to this perception, a comic-book vision made real, as to the towers and what 
they represented. It is another ‘bad novel’. Second, from closer, the pictures of tiny 
human figures peering through windows and the smoke from the upper floors of the 
stricken buildings, preparing to jump to their deaths: a vision out of Hieronymous 
Bosch, likely to touch most hearts. Pictures have a special power but also a simplicity 
and, by virtue of the very openness which can stimulate our imaginations, a proneness 
to distorted interpretation. At the intersection of pictures and writing come lists: like 
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lists of the names of victims (Simpson 2001), as in Washington DC’s Vietnam War 
Memorial which lists 58,000 Americans against the dark background of unmentioned 
millions of Vietnamese. 
Written accounts call forth images too but try to inform and lead our interpreta-
tion more. Building a sense of real people through evocative detail, recounting situa-
tions and events in which we could imagine ourselves, and drawing out unforeseen ef-
fects, can engage our sympathy for those described. Our facility in mentally construct-
ing scenarios brings the danger that we think we understand when in fact we don’t 
(Becker 1998). Novels typically write-in linking scenarios for us, to try to ensure that 
we do understand. They try to not just show a process in their characters, but to induce 
its counterpart in the reader; and claim to be both more accessible and deeper than re-
portage alone. 
Wayne Booth argued in The Rhetoric of Fiction that sympathy ‘is technically 
produced and controlled by the devices of access, closeness and distance’ (Nair 2000: 
114). First: ‘We are more likely to sympathise with people when we have a lot of in-
formation about their inner lives, motivation, fears, etc.’ (p. 110). This is the method 
eschewed by economics (and by the picture from afar), whose analyses strictly ration 
both information and sympathy, following Denis Robertson’s premise that nothing is 
scarcer than love for one’s fellow man. Second: ‘We sympathise with people when we 
see other people who do not share our access to their inner lives [DG: e.g. external 
economists] judging them harshly or incorrectly. In life we get this kind of information 
through intimacy and friendship. In fiction we get it through the narrator, either reliably 
reported by the narrator or through direct access to the minds of the characters’ (pp. 
110-11). In the controlled and contrived world of fiction we trust the author. Thirdly, 
‘Information alone cannot necessarily elicit a sympathetic response. Sometimes it is the 
careful control of the flow of information, which controls a reader's judgement.’ (p. 
111). When a reader shares information that he knows one character has and another 
lacks, it tends to place him in the former’s shoes and on their side. A third person narra-
tor may present events to us but through the protagonist’s eyes, thus making us see her 
with both distance and involvement, as in Jane Austen’s novel Emma. We both see 
Emma’s faults and come to care for her, to share the project of her maturation. 
Nussbaum proposes that ‘there are some moral views which can be adequately 
expressed only through novels’, thanks to their scale and style of investigation, reports 
Cora Diamond (1998: 39). The central moral payoff from novels is not even so much 
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from following what the characters experience and how they choose, but, says Nuss-
baum, from following how the novelist reflects on this. The reflection comes not as 
formal general arguments; yet those are what most philosophers search for from litera-
ture, often impervious to its ambiguities, warn Diamond, Nussbaum and others. Adam-
son fears that Nussbaum herself is overly prone to impose a lucid order, find a ready 
answer, rather than sometimes live with indeterminacy. Nussbaum repeatedly declares 
that she is open to that, and insists that a literary work be read as a whole, not dipped 
into for selected illustrations (e.g. 2001b: 14). If a group reads a work together it gives 
a shared base for discussion, unlike their diverse personal experiences. Literature 
maintains also the awareness that there is more in life than we know or understand, 
whereas so much ethics is narrowly, overconfidently knowing (Diamond 1998: 51). 
Literature offers us not propositional systems but builds our sensitivity and imagination 
– our heart and soul (Adamson 1998: 89). Novels can cast particular light on how ‘the 
self comes into being as a dialogic process’ (Hillis Miller, cited by Parker 1998: 13), 
rather than being inherent like the kernel of a nut. Identity can be seen, says Nair, as 
derived from the relationships between persons, ‘the system of differences through 
which individuality is constructed / structured’; or ‘as a narrative. The only way to ex-
plain who we are is to tell our own story’ (Nair 2000: 109). 
Nair warns, as did Adamson of Nussbaum, that Booth’s picture is too tidy. 
Readers are more independent of the author. Booth disapproves of thoroughgoing 
reader identification with characters, for it loses the reader’s impartiality and moral 
autonomy. Yet it happens, and at a deeper level than sympathy: ‘Identification suggests 
self-recognition’ (Nair, p. 114) and thus modification and extension of the reader’s self. 
This identification reflects a different sort of autonomy of the reader, autonomy from 
the author. Choices of identification are reader-relative. Readers often see differently, 
post-modern thought reminded us. The power of the author, even the great author, and 
the predictability of reader reactions, can be exaggerated. 
So, literature can help build sensitivity and imagination. It expresses and evokes 
emotions, which––if well nurtured––can help us to better recognize what is involved in 
situations and what is important, as well as to respond and act (e.g. Nussbaum 2001b: 
xvii, ch. 7). It can generate questions, perception of possibilities and, says Adamson, a 
sense of people’s lives—rather than by itself give answers to ‘how should we live?’, let 
alone a general conception of ‘Life’ (1998: 104). Nussbaum does not claim otherwise 
(see e.g. 2001b: 134). She has investigated with great vigour and sweep certain areas of 
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sensitivity and imagination, without restriction to literature as source-material or as an-
swer. 
We saw earlier that there is a place both for thinner more depersonalized analy-
ses and thicker personal narratives. Wiltshire shows the limitations of contemporary 
bioethics and contrasts it unfavourably with ‘illness narratives’ (‘pathography’) written 
by patients and other lay participants in medical cases. There could be a direct parallel 
for development ethics and the ethics of emergency relief. Bioethics is an abstracted 
and academic type of activity which uses cases intensively, but only as illustrations, for 
building general classifications, guidelines and codes. It follows the cases only up to a 
point for decision by a medical professional. To protect anonymity and to abstract suf-
ficiently in order to try to generate general principles, it ‘routinely alters [cases’] setting 
and culture, supposing that this leaves the “essential” aspects of the case untouched’ 
(Wiltshire 1998: 188). Yet the particular details may well be central to the meaning of 
the case. Wiltshire argues that given this situational specificity and complexity of cases, 
and the prevalence of vital aspects which are not tidily commensurable, we should not 
rely on general rulebooks but on educated judgement based on deep immersion and the 
use of educated emotions. Illness narratives may offer such immersion and education. 
They look at emotions, at illnesses in the context of whole lives and personal relation-
ships, and tell real histories not anecdotes or reductive simplifications or momentary 
situation reports. Their narratives capture actors-in-context-and-in-time. They illustrate 
conflicting viewpoints, desperate time pressures, unforeseen events and undesired ef-
fects, and the transformation of perspectives in face of extreme experiences and trau-
mas (Wiltshire, pp. 188-9). They fulfil most of the functions which Nussbaum identi-
fies as required in ethics, but without the frills of fiction and with more realism. 
‘Death concentrates the mind wonderfully’ said Samuel Johnson, Wiltshire re-
minds us. We see this in the literature and practice of emergency relief. Routine, dis-
persed death seems to fail to concentrate the mind, as we observe in India and globally. 
Examination of emergency relief cases and literature suggests to me that we need both 
‘pathography’, the emergency narrative of a William Shawcross (1984), and the at-
tempts to organize and interpret such experience by a Hugo Slim (e.g. 1997). We need 
general guidelines together with an ethics of care and character and a contextual ethics 
that grapples with cases (Gasper 1999). Wiltshire perhaps implicitly accepts such a 
complementarity, for he concludes that bioethics must be upgraded by ‘enhancement of 
the narrative tools upon which its discourse depends’ (p. 197). 
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3.3  Sympathy and commitment, compassion and mercy 
An enormous virtue of Nussbaum’s work is its attention to emotions, including 
to their roles in ethical judgement and ethical action, and to their dangers, distortions 
and determinants. Emotions figure as central capability no. 6 in WHD’s list, and in nos. 
7-9: affiliation, play, and relations with other species. To describe and explain, and to 
persuade and act effectively, we need to understand, employ and influence much be-
sides ‘utility’ and ‘preference’. Not least, we need more attention to the the realms of 
care, besides the realms of freedom and of justice (van Staveren 2001), and to issues 
raised by Sen in the 1970s under the labels ‘sympathy’ and ‘commitment’, but not since 
taken much further by him. 
Sen stressed the presence and importance of motives other than self-interest. 
Nussbaum points out that ‘one cannot fully articulate Sen’s own more complex predic-
tive and normative theory of reasoning without prominently including the emotions in 
which parts of that reasoning are embodied’ (2001a: 392). In Sen’s usage, ‘sympathy’ 
means felt satisfaction which is derived from seeing or contributing to the well-being of 
others; and ‘commitment’ meant the willingness to act towards goals other than the 
agent’s own well-being, including the well-being of others, even though this will not 
raise and might diminish the agent’s well-being. Sen’s distinctions perhaps still re-
flected the mould of utilitarianism: only one type of felt satisfaction was recognized. A 
concern for others which did not make the agent happy was then not seen as sympathy, 
even though the word’s parts (sym-pathy) mean feeling-with. ‘Commitment’ remained 
a disconnected, somewhat mysterious category. 
Nussbaum explores further the world of multiple emotions. Compassion (her  
preferred term for sympathy) has a central role in moral, and thus all social, life.
3 While  
for example Elster’s treatise on the emotions mentions it only briefly (pp. 68-70, as 
pity), Nussbaum examines it on an appropriate scale. ‘…a basic sort of compassion for 
suffering individuals, built on meanings learnt in childhood’ appears virtually universal 
and quasi-natural, and often survives even massive counterforces of ideology and so-
cialization (2001a: 389). ‘By contrast, an abstract moral theory uninhabited by those  
                                                 
3 Whereas Sen’s ‘commitment’ highlights a concern for others which is distinct from one’s own well-
being, Nussbaum sometimes defines emotions too narrowly: as concerning things outside a person’s con-
trol which have great importance for the person’s own flourishing (2001b:4, 22). Our own goals and our 
own flourishing need to be distinguished, Sen would say; for we can sacrifice ourselves for others and 
for ideals. 
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connections of imagination and sympathy can easily be turned to evil ends, because its 
human meaning is unclear’ (pp. 389-90). Emotion is certainly not a sufficient guide, 
she emphasizes, but it is a necessary component; and emotions can be educated. 
Nussbaum distinguishes empathy, ability to imagine the experience of another 
person, from compassion, seen as concern (‘a painful emotion’) ‘at another person’s 
undeserved misfortune’ (2001a: 301). She takes sympathy to be coterminous with 
compassion, or a mild version of it; and avoids the term pity, deeming it now tainted by 
condescension. She then reviews Aristotle’s diagnosis of the intellectual structure of 
compassion. Aristotle described it as concern for the misfortune of another person, aris-
ing when that misfortune is seen by the observer as (1) major, (2) undeserved, and (3) 
of a type which could happen to himself. Nussbaum endorses the first two posited 
parts, and gives good reasons to consider the third a relevant contributory factor but not 
a necessary feature. She replaces it with (3*): the misfortune happens to someone (or 
some being) who figures within the observer’s universe of concern. The re-
specification seems meant as an empirical description; it is not argued like a typical 
definition, in terms of convention, etymology or logic, but on the basis of cases of real 
or imagined feelings. The diagnosis helps Nussbaum find impediments to compassion: 
envy, shame and disgust, which belittle others’ sufferings or exclude them from one’s 
universe of concern (2001a: 423); and fear of acquiring duties to help (2001b: xxxvii). 
It also implies ways to try to promote appropriate compassion, by spreading more ade-
quate theories of (1) ethical importance, (2) causation and desert, and (3) the scope of 
ethical community. 
We can question too Aristotle’s second component, the idea that compassion 
does not apply to deserved misfortune. In this case the component is stipulated by 
Nussbaum as part of her definition, but that seems to exceed ordinary usage. The term 
‘compassion’—to feel with or for another’s suffering; ‘pity inclining one to help or be 
merciful’ (Oxford Dictionary)—does not by etymology or convention imply that the 
suffering is undeserved (see also Comte-Sponville 2002: 106 ff.), even though that can 
certainly be a reinforcing factor; consider for example the case of children in very poor 
countries. Nussbaum refines her stipulation in two important ways: if the misfortune is 
excessive compared to the misdemeanour, or if the misdemeanour is related to factors 
beyond the agent’s control, then compassion can arise. But a discrepancy may remain. 
Can one not feel compassion for someone who ruined his life through his own 
greed or selfishness; or, against Nussbaum’s own example (2001a: 336), feel compas-
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sion for an adult child, fully responsible for herself, who has reaped the fruits of her 
own folly ? Nussbaum cites a study that suggests contemporary Americans might feel 
no compassion in those cases: Americans are reported to typically partition cases neatly 
into those where a person’s own agency can make a difference and where they are then 
deemed responsible for what happens, and other cases where what happens is deemed 
simply out of a person’s control (2001a: 313). Then if one declares that AIDS victims 
in Africa are suffering through nobody’s fault but their own, and need not be helped, 
this is no longer labelled lack of compassion; and if one declares that Northern farmers 
are suffering disruption of their life-plans through decline in their accustomed standard 
of life, then farm subsidies and trade barriers claim the garb of compassion. The pres-
tigious label for a key emotion can be hijacked by crude and biased judgements of de-
sert and of the bounds of concern. The Stoics warned against this manipulability and 
partiality of compassion (2001a: ch. 7); and one worries nowadays at a marriage of Ar-
istotelian frames and contemporary American perceptions. 
Clarity increases if we drop the insistence that people can only be held either 
fully responsible or not at all responsible. It increases too if we look at a sister to com-
passion: mercy. Compassion is for a victim, mercy is for a culprit, says Nussbaum. (In 
some cases there are only victims.) But in effect we can extend compassion to a culprit 
if we see damage which he has earlier suffered. He may be held partially blameworthy 
but not punishably so, and hence deserving compassion if he has been punished as if 
fully responsible. If the mitigation is less, he may be held punishably blameworthy; but 
it can still lead us to mitigate punishment, extend mercy. In a fine essay on ‘Equity and 
Mercy’ (1999a: ch. 6) Nussbaum relates mercy to an attention to the detailed particular 
circumstances and histories of persons, such as provided in rich, realistic novels, depth 
journalism and humanistic anthropology. We come to see the forces, complexities and 
chances, often beyond the control of individuals, which contribute to misfortunes and 
misdemeanours. Whether one factor forms grounds for mitigation or for the opposite 
depends on its combination with the other factors, so: ‘Telling the whole story, with all 
the particulars, is the only way to get at that’ (1999a: 177). Punishment is not deter-
mined exclusively by the degree of mitigation, but also by concerns like deterrence and 
the other effects and costs. So we need not be so frightened of extending compassion. 
Similarly, compassion does not logically imply that we must act to remedy the situa-
tion, for that depends also on the effects and costs of the attempt. Again the implication 
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is that we may not need to ration compassion so much. We can show compassion as 
well as mercy to those whom we consider in error. 
 
3.4  Rhetorical strategy, tact and tactics 
Nussbaum reaches out to a variety of audiences through a variety of media––
books and lectures, magazine articles and tv discussions––on a series of striking topics 
which she shows to be interconnected. Her rhetorical strengths include lucidity, a great 
range of examples, and her evident intense sincerity. A further strength is her practice 
sometimes of a style of ‘internal criticism’, expounded in a 1987 paper written jointly 
with Sen. They argued that the range of intellectual sources and resources within a cul-
ture provide bases for it to learn and evolve, including in response to influences from 
outside, rather than by demanding acceptance of ‘parachuted in’ external packages of 
ideas that may lack local resonance, relevance or acceptability. Commentators and crit-
ics are likely to have more influence if they build to a great extent on those internal 
sources and resources. A parallel claim exists for discussion and criticism of intellec-
tual schools and particular authors: that it is generally more effective for critics to take 
seriously the authors’ aspirations, projects and sincerity, and show how the aspirations 
can be better fulfilled by certain substitutions. Küng’s global ethics project offers a 
good model of how to build from within as well as without. Nussbaum practises this in 
WHD, and seeks agreements on conclusions even where there is disagreement on prem-
ises and routes. 
Her late 1980s and early 1990s pieces on capabilities, in contrast, relied heavily 
on an externally specified neo-Aristotelian vision of ‘the good life for man’, and met 
extensive resistance, as well as high praise. Inspired by passion, Nussbaum’s comments 
seemed occasionally distorted by it, further departing from the spirit of internal criti-
cism. WHD helpfully proceeds more in that spirit, for example in chapter 3 on religion, 
where Nussbaum listens intently within a culture and builds with its own moral tradi-
tion and categories. This is consistent too with adoption of a Rawlsian political liberal-
ism, which provides space for various comprehensive ethics rather than trying to en-
force any one. It extends the approach’s tool-kit and political relevance. At the same 
time Nussbaum certainly notes the danger that internal discourse in tradition-based eth-
ics can become ethnocentric reendorsement, and the need for external critical inputs 
(Parker 1998). 
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In this difficult balancing act, aspects of Nussbaum’s tactics and tone can be 
questioned. In WHD she sometimes ventures emphatic views on various Indian matters 
which she may understand insufficiently. For example, she treats Gandhianism as the 
antithesis of the Western, although its founder spent twenty-five formative years in 
Britain and South Africa to return to India as a dedicated revolutionary (p. 67). She 
seems to excuse the inexcusable in India: ‘the nation is in no position to enforce either 
these laws [mandating compulsory education] or laws against child labour at this time’ 
(p. 231), a statement that lacks credibility given what has been achieved in Sri Lanka 
and Kerala. As in the past, the lapses into over-assertion arise in the course of defend-
ing people’s rights to—and to be able to—form, have, and use opinions. They remain a 
pity; a lesson from the Shah Bano case which Nussbaum valuably discusses is that tac-
tics matter, besides good intentions.
4
In the Shah Bano case, the Chief Justice of the Indian Supreme Court, a Hindu, 
awarded maintenance to an elderly Muslim woman who had been summarily divorced 
by her husband by using Muslim personal law, after 44 years of marriage. The judge 
made numerous comments on the deficiencies of Muslim practices and the require-
ments of Muslim scriptures if properly interpreted. Many would say he fell into the tac-
tical trap of seeking publicly to interpret others’ religion for them. The Muslim back-
lash against his ruling, and Rajiv Gandhi’s search for votes, led to civil legal buttress-
ing of the regressive Muslim personal law. 
Nussbaum notes that trap and seeks to avoid it, indeed she takes a political tac-
tical line for not supporting the Shah Bano verdict. She may fall instead into the trap of 
ghettoization, in her conclusion that withdrawal of state recognition from the dominant 
but questionable interpretation of Muslim family law would under present circum-
stances be ‘difficult to dissociate [from]... a relegation of Muslim citizens to second-
class status’ (2001a: 178); and likewise in her claim that ‘given the history of Muslims 
in India, it seems apparent that any abolition of the system of Islamic law would be a 
grave threat to religious liberty and a statement that Muslims would not be fully equal 
as citizens’ (p. 211). 
Half the Muslim citizens, the women, already have a real second-class status,  
                                                 
4 WHD also has an uneasy feel for figures: e.g. p.27 cites 10,000 aborted Indian female fetuses p.a., which 
appears a vast underestimate, and p.30 reports two girls raped a day, as if this number was major or realistic 
in a nation of one billion. Hopefully such matters can be corrected in a reprint. 
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given by this very law; and the proposal was not to abolish Islamic personal law, but to 
give persons the right to opt out into civil law, a right that should apply to all citizens. 
To prevent that right is the real threat to religious liberty, and transfers all religious lib-
erty for Muslims to mullahs, who then alone determine the meaning and evolution of  
Muslim religious tenets. An indefensible law, politically protected for electoral reasons, 
seems more likely to contribute to a feeling by others that Muslims are second-rate citi-
zens. Unfortunately, defensive conservatism and external denigration can become mu-
tually reinforcing. 
Nussbaum argues her position at length, but may be overemphatic in a political 
judgement about a country she still knows relatively little, and too brief in laying out  
the options in the debate. One respects, however, her project of internal criticism here, 
with close reference to debates within India and the concepts and judgements which 
they presume, and her belief that traditions are more than a set of petrified practices and 
instead contain sub-traditions of reflection and the potential to evolve. Elsewhere in 
much of her work she is admirable in letting us see options and what is at stake. 
When Nussbaum feels passionately that a particular view is not just mistaken 
about something important but actually dangerous, her powers of eloquence turn her 
prolific pen into a double-edged sword. Convinced of her cause, she sometimes take no 
prisoners; those declared guilty are publicly despatched, even in many published ver-
sions. A 1980s dispute with the Marglins was prominent in a 1992 article, a 1995 book, 
and still in 1999’s Sex and Social Justice. A grey-material pamphlet by Veena Das 
from 1981 is impaled in that book, and again in WHD. In the ‘Professor of Parody’ case 
in New Republic during 1999, most of Nussbaum’s comments as reviewer seem well-
argued and some of the reactions to them misplaced or overheated; but there is overkill 
in tone and some unnecessarily hurtful flourishes. Nussbaum needs to maintain schol-
ars such as Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser, two of those who protested at the essay’s 
manner, within her discursive circle. Deirdre McCloskey’s elegant debating style (e.g. 
in: McCloskey 1994) and her and Arjo Klamer’s ‘Maxim of Presumed Seriousness’ 
(1989) constitute good advice on ‘The Rhetoric of Disagreement’. Just as there are 
standard reasons for mercy and sympathetic mitigation, well reviewed by Nussbaum, 
there are good reasons for leaning to the side of understatement in disagreements. 
WHD’s implicit primary audience is North American, as seen in its lengthy dis-
cussions of US law cases and the style of its periodic advice to Western feminists. Es-
pecially if there are any conventions and imperatives in American public discourse 
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which reward and motivate overstatement, one should remember the danger that some 
non-American audiences can stereotype Americans as sleek, arrogant, closed, naïve, 
dominating and overinfluential. American authors seeking a global audience have to 
counteract this. Most of WHD and Nussbaum’s other recent work counter the danger 
well, but with problem spots which we have mentioned. 
There is much to be learnt from Sen’s tactics and style, which contribute to his 
ability to mobilize collaborators and have influence through diverse research and policy 
networks. He takes care to identify common ground, to build and preserve a convincing 
ethos, to encourage others, and to collaborate and lead in joint work, such as with Jean 
Dreze, Sudhir Anand and for the HDRs (see Gasper 2000a). 
 
4 CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
1. Nussbaum’s already impressive contribution has broadened and deepened in 
her published work since the late 1990s. Women and Human Development provides a 
systematic and rewarding treatment of some central issues in development ethics and of 
a series of enlightening cases. It contains advances in each of the aspects of persuasion–
–logos, pathos, ethos––though it remains work in progress which leaves many issues 
requiring further attention.
5 Its priority capabilities list, in particular, could be upgraded 
with a framework such as Doyal and Gough’s or Alkire’s. 
2. Nussbaum’s formulations on capabilities must be understood however as not 
just a priority list, but as a way of proceeding, a broad approach to ethics and human 
development. This paper has centred not on fine-tuning a list and the approach’s theory 
of the good, but on the roles of a list and the approach’s other components. We thus 
identified and considered elements other than those which refer directly to capabilities. 
We touched on ideas about audiences and purposes, on background concepts and val-
ues, including concepts of personhood and emotion, and on the approach’s sources and 
methods for obtaining and interpreting materials. We considered in particular how the 
choices of purpose, audience, and stage of work connect to choices of methods and 
sources. 
3. Various choices of audience and of the line and timespan of projected influ-
ence appear legitimate. Nussbaum seems to seek longer run influence on constitutional 
                                                 
5 Several issues are taken further in Nussbaum’s 2003 Tanner lectures: the extension of her approach to 
the disabled, across national boundaries, and to non human life. 
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and legal frameworks and on political culture, in order to buttress compassion, cos-
mopolitanism and human rights. She aims to influence how people listen, see and act, 
and thus to change listeners and not only their information set. Her time horizon is con-
sciously relatively long term, as seen in her stress on upgrading of school and college 
education, in rich countries too. 
Her focus does match some essential stages, purposes and audiences for ethics. 
We saw for example that Sen’s hypothesis that a democracy will prevent famines relies 
on a degree of felt political community. But suppose there is little such community: 
crippling shortage amongst marginal groups will not receive attention and concern in 
the national or even regional metropoli, let alone internationally. Similarly, Sen’s capa-
bility approach might be worth communicating to a corporation that accepts the notion 
of corporate social responsibility; but suppose that the corporation does not. Given the 
extent and even growth of selfishness and narrow group-ism both globally and intra-
nationally, Nussbaum’s attention to the bases of concern for others is highly relevant in 
policy ethics, not only in personal ethics. 
4. We see therefore the pertinence of her focus on the analysis and education of  
emotions, especially compassion. For social and development policy, the emotion of 
compassion appears central, and Nussbaum provides a valuable detailed examination. 
She points out its vulnerability to narrowly defensive specifications of who is within 
the universe of moral consideration, of how seriously they are or would be harmed by a 
situation, and of how far they are themselves to blame for it. (Think of the recent Jo-
hannesburg summit on sustainable development.) However, one can doubt Nussbaum’s 
adoption of the Aristotelian conceptualization of compassion as necessarily or contin-
gently arising only when a misfortune is undeserved. A desert criterion is relevant, but 
to make it essential seems questionable. Nussbaum now adds a separate category of 
mercy––benevolence toward the culpable but partly condonable wrong-doer––but that 
does not fully right the debate. 
5. Nussbaum advocates the study of imaginative literature in order to examine 
and educate compassion and the emotions more generally. I endorse this proposal, even 
if the power of ‘Great Books’ for many audiences can easily be exaggerated. Questions 
remain about the balance between types of literature (fictional, historical, biographical, 
autobiographical etc.), and about how one might feasibly and effectively promote such 
study within the confines of education in social sciences and the professions, including 
  33 
in development studies. We cannot look to Nussbaum for all the answers; this is one 
direction for future work.
6  
6. Nussbaum’s enormous agenda brings a need for many types of evidence, col-
laboration and interaction. Perceptions of her own degrees of empathy, compassion, 
mercy and cosmopolitanism become important, especially given the frequency of reac-
tions elsewhere against Americans from elite settings. In debate with those who differ, 
and in seeking to attract cooperators and fellow travellers, tact and tactics are vital. In-
deed Nussbaum’s writings are mainly empathetic, compassionate, judicious, and merci-
ful; but with some possible lapses, of commission (in disputes) and omission (in collabo-
rations). We can learn from how Sen has so effectively fostered a major research pro-
gramme through building collegiality, networks and partnerships and through defusing 
resistance. 
7. It was helpful to itemize and contrast the contents of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s 
approaches, but neither is fixed and finished. The purpose of the content analysis was to 
better understand what they say; to try to assist each of these sister programmes to im-
prove; and to promote a well articulated connection and a productive and cooperative 
working relationship between them. We are interested in building a capability / capa-
bilities / post-capabilities approach that transcends and outlives its founders, and that 
effectively contributes towards human development. 
                                                 
6 Envisaged work by Jay Drydyk and others on the teaching of global and development ethics could in-
clude this. 
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